Strict glycemic control (SGC) carries the risk of severe hypoglycemia (SH). Indeed, with SGC the incidence of SH (defined as a blood glucose concentration Ͻ40 mg/dL) is five-to ten-fold higher as compared with a conventional blood glucose strategy (1, 2).
From "inconvenient truth" to "assault on reason"
To the Editor:
Strict glycemic control (SGC) carries the risk of severe hypoglycemia (SH). Indeed, with SGC the incidence of SH (defined as a blood glucose concentration Ͻ40 mg/dL) is five-to ten-fold higher as compared with a conventional blood glucose strategy (1, 2) .
To determine the risk factors for SH and define its outcomes, Drs. Krinsley and Grover (3) performed a retrospective database review, including a case-control analysis that matched each patient with SH with three controls. Cases and controls were extracted from a series of patients during three consecutive periods, during which no standardized approach to glycemic monitoring or management was present, a program of SGC was instituted (targeting 80 -140 mg/dL), and a more strict SGC was applied (targeting 80 -125 mg/dL), respectively. The main finding was that mortality was 56% among the 102 patients with SH vs. 40% among controls. Diabetes, septic shock, renal insufficiency, mechanical ventilation, severity of illness, and treatment in the SGC period were identified as independent risk factors for SH. Multivariable logistic regression analysis identified SH as an independent predictor of mortality for the entire cohort (odds ratio [OR], 2.28; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.41-3.70). From these results, the investigators suggest "safer implementation of SGC will accrue following development of new technologies to monitor glycemic levels, perhaps on a continuous basis." Does this mean that, in other words, at present SGC is an "unsafe" strategy?
Are we to understand that approximately 30% of patients with SH were not on insulin therapy in the preceding 12 hrs? Also, very much in contrast to the studies by van den Berghe (1, 2) , was only a minority of patients on intravenous insulin therapy? If so, this study hardly offers an answer to the question whether SH with SGC truly influences morbidity and mortality.
Dr. Suh and colleagues (4) recently showed that hypoglycemia-induced oxidative stress and neuronal death are attributable primarily to the activation of neuronal NADPH oxidase during glucose reperfusion. Of note, the degree of oxidative stress and neuronal death increased with increasing glucose concentrations during the reperfusion period. These results suggest that not SH by itself, but high blood glucose concentration following hypoglycemic coma, can initiate neuronal death. The study by Drs. Krinsley and Grover (3) is retrospective in its design, and it may not be possible to retrieve data on how severe hypoglycemia was corrected for each individual case. The authors, however, may provide us with their protocol for correction of severe hypoglycemia.
From "inconvenient truth" to an "assault on reason": Over the last years we have "inconveniently" learned that accepting high blood glucose concentration, intrinsic to severe illness, is harming our patients. However, the medical literature is loaded, and dominated, with reports and opinion pieces arguing against SGC, at least in part based on the finding that SGC comes with an increased risk for SH. Let us be careful in interpreting data with regard to SGC. Indeed, we consider the risk of SH to not be a reason for failing to implement SGC.
The authors reply:
We concur heartily with the conclusions of Drs. Schultz, de Graaff, Kuiper, and Spronk that "we consider the risk of SH [severe hypoglycemia] to not be a reason for failing to implement" tight glycemic control. In fact, the sensitivity analysis included in our manuscript makes the point that the beneficial effect of tight glycemic control would not have been eliminated unless the rate of SH quadrupled and the mortality attributable to an episode doubled. Recognition of the potential for harm should foster efforts for safer implementation of insulin treatment protocols, not abandonment of the therapy.
The data of Dr. Suh and colleagues are indeed very intriguing (1) . The effect of glycemic variability, known in diabetics to increase oxidative stress (2) , is a topic that we are currently investigating. James S. Krinsley Dr. Kompanje and colleagues (1) describe a case of "Euthanasia in Intensive Care" that involved a competent patient with a devastating neurologic condition who chose to refuse continuation of life support and to be allowed to die. The salient ethical principles in this case are: a) the right of competent patients to refuse any and all unwanted medical treatments; and b) the obligation of clinicians to assure that patients are comfortable and without suffering through the dying process. These principles are ethically and legally accepted in North America and, I believe, most of Western Europe. This case conformed to both of these principles. Describing this as a case of euthanasia is unnecessarily provoca-tive, and implies that the actions taken by these Dutch physicians would not be permissible in other countries.
In euthanasia, a lethal dose of medications is the proximate cause of death. In this case, withdrawal of the ventilator was certain to lead to death, regardless of whether any medications were administered. One could debate whether the medications administered (30 mg of midazolam and 1.4 g of thiopentone) would have been lethal in the absence of ventilator withdrawal. (This is precisely the issue currently being considered by the U.S. Supreme Court, in which similarly large doses administered in the context of lethal injection apparently have not been fatal.) But this question aside, administration of a "lethal" dose of medication would have been superfluous in this case, because withdrawal of the ventilator was certain to be lethal, and the only relevant goal of the medications was to make sure that the patient was not conscious and did not suffer during the process.
I have personally managed several similar cases in my intensive care unit in a virtually identical fashion to that described here (2), one of which was subsequently cited by U.S. Supreme Court Justice David Souter as an example of good palliative care, not of euthanasia. Souter wrote: "The State permits physicians to alleviate anxiety and discomfort when withdrawing artificial life supporting devices by administering medication that will hasten death even further. And it generally permits physicians to administer medication to patients in terminal conditions when the primary intent is to alleviate pain, even when the medication is so powerful as to hasten death and the patient chooses to receive it with that understanding" (3) .
Intensive care clinicians should be encouraged to respect the wishes of competent patients to refuse unwanted medical treatment, and should be reassured that they may administer whatever doses of sedatives and analgesics are necessary to make a patient comfortable, without being misled by the mistaken notion that what they are doing in such cases is "euthanasia." The recent article by Dr. Kompanje and colleagues (1), describing the "intentional termination of life" of an ICU patient with locked-in syndrome, raises important clinical, ethical, and legal questions.
Despite its phenomenal progress, modern medicine has created many new problems. We are now faced with dramatically explicit questions: Does the patient have the right to be killed? Is it the doctor's duty to grant such a request? In general, does the doctor have the right to deliberately end a patient's life?
I would like to propose two considerations. Firstly, we must avoid a fundamental misunderstanding: that what is established by law is per se ethically acceptable. Clearly, each country has sovereignty over its own legislation, but the legal and ethical planes are distinct, even if both contribute to every decisionmaking process. (The legal plane defines what, in a given society and period, is recognized as lawful; the ethical plane essentially concerns the intrinsic value of an action, its "goodness" and acceptability.) Similarly, merely observing that a practice exists does not make it ethically acceptable. On such crucial matters, I feel it is essential that "unless ethics becomes a merely reactive and adaptive mechanism to a changing reality, ethical and legal norms-what ought to be doneshould not be deduced from observed behaviors-what is done. Instead, they need to be elaborated from moral principles and values" (2) .
Secondly, while we have progressed from the medical paternalism of the past, the respect which is rightly accorded to the principle of autonomy (3) must not be allowed to box the doctor into a sort of moral neutrality. The doctor is not an ethically "neutral" subject, a blank sheet on which patients may express whatever wish they may have. Doctors also have ethical convictions, and the doctorpatient relationship therefore represents the meeting of two autonomies. From the confrontation, and full and frank exchange, between these two subjects (the "therapeutic covenant") must arise a shared decision that also considers the ethical dimension. In the case of conflict on the ethical plane, I believe the doctor should have the right of conscientious objection.
The dramatic condition of the patient described by Dr. Kompanje and colleagues (1) brings us face to face with the objective limits of medicine. However, I personally continue to believe that there is a substantial difference between killing and allowing to die (4), and I agree with the recommendations made on this for the intensive care setting (5) . We have the duty to look after our patients and to palliate suffering, even at the price of suppressing-if necessary-the patient's consciousness.
In intensive care also, the key issues in evaluating the ethical acceptability of physicians' choices and actions are intention and means employed. On the ethical plane, the intention to alleviate suffering is quite different from the voluntary and deliberate action of taking a person's life.
In my opinion, the universal imperative "not to kill" is still valid, and I sincerely hope that euthanasia does not become an accepted option for intensive care patients. The authors reply:
We thank Dr. Truog for his comments on our case description of a patient asking us to deliberately end his life.
Dr. Truog holds the opinion that we have not described a case of euthanasia, but simply compassionate clinical palliative care, and that describing this case as a case of euthanasia is unnecessarily provocative. We must however strongly disagree.
Given that the patient was not dependent on the ventilator, respiratory failure and death was not likely to occur following withdrawal of the ventilator. The patient was breathing spontaneously on continuous positive airway pressure only. Therefore, palliative care using thiopental following ventilator withdrawal would have been against professional palliative consensus and illegal in the Netherlands. Therefore, the consistent request of the patient to end his life while still on the ventilator was in line with our law on euthanasia.
Additionally, euthanasia in the Netherlands is done by the intravenous administration of a sedative, a barbiturate, and in most cases a muscle relaxant, which is the most reliable and rapid way to accomplish euthanasia. First, the patient is put to sleep by the intravenous injection of 30 mg midazolam. Second, a coma is induced by intravenous administration of 20 mg/kg thiopental. Finally, an intravenous dose of a nondepolarizing neuromuscular muscle relaxant can be given (i.e., 20 mg pancuronium or vecuronium bromide) to induce complete paralysis resulting in asphyxia and death due to anoxemia. The procedure of euthanasia is thus a two-stage process in which the muscle relaxant is used when the patient does not die within minutes following the administration of thiopental.
Thiopental is known to rapidly cause severe cardiovascular and respiratory depression resulting in hypotension and apnea (1) . A sufficiently large dose will depress the respiratory drive and cause respiratory acidosis and hypoxemia. This, together with the cardiovascular depression, will in many cases cause immediate death. In a Dutch study, the recommended combination of intravenous thiopental with a muscle relaxant was chosen in 56 cases. However, 11 patients (19.6%) died immediately following the administration of thiopental even before the planned muscle relaxant could be given. In the remaining 45 cases (80.4%), the administration of thiopental was followed by a muscle relaxant (pancuronium) (2) . Another Dutch study showed that in 10% of 545 euthanasia cases, a barbiturate was the only or the most potent lethal drug administered (3). In a Belgian study, it was shown that in 206 cases of euthanasia (28% of all cases) the injection of thiopental without the use of a muscle relaxant resulted in immediate death (4) .
For this reason, thiopental is not used in palliative care in the Netherlands. Administering thiopental as a palliative measure resulting in death of an unconscious patient in the intensive care unit would be deliberate termination of life without the request of the patient, and is equal to murder in the Netherlands. Thiopental only is used in the process of euthanasia. In our patient, thiopental also resulted in immediate death. The physician who performed the euthanasia planned to follow the usual two-stage procedure of euthanasia; however, the administration of the pancuronium bromide, already available at the bedside, was unnecessary.
The assumption of Dr. Truog that the patient was ventilator dependent is probably the main reason why he thinks this is not a case of euthanasia given that, in his opinion, withdrawal of the ventilator was certain to lead to death, regardless of whether any medications were administered. However, the suggestion of Dr. Truog that the administration of 30 mg midazolam and 1.4 g thiopental could not have led to death following ventilator withdrawal is in contradiction to the publications discussed above and the course of our patient.
We therefore have described the case as an intended and deliberate termination of life (euthanasia) in the intensive care unit. The clinical situation of the patient and the actions taken in combination with the medications used are not consistent with normal palliative care in the Netherlands, but only with the process of euthanasia. We did not intend to be provocative in this way. True, euthanasia by the method described is very rare in intensive care in the Netherlands. Withdrawal of treatment, followed by the administration of palliative (not lethal) doses of opioids and/or benzodiazepines such as midazolam or propofol, is very common. In the Netherlands, thiopental has no place in normal palliative care because it can cause the immediate death of the patient.
We also would like to thank Dr. Giannini for his comments on our article. We share his view that modern medicine has created many new problems and confronts physicians with very difficult questions. We also agree that the plane of ethics and the plane of the law differ. We are, however, convinced that euthanasia is justified in the ethical plane given certain very strict safeguards and conditions. Given these ethical safeguards, euthanasia is legally allowed in the Netherlands. We have had a very long, thorough, and complex debate on the ethical justification of euthanasia in the Netherlands among physicians, philosophers, jurists, and the general public before the law in the Netherlands came into force in 2002. It is certainly not the other way around, that because it is legal we think it is ethical.
We also agree with Dr. Giannini that the physician is not an instrument obligated to carry out patients' wishes; in the Netherlands, a physician is not obliged to perform euthanasia. On the other hand, a moral responsibility to end the suffering of a patient at his request can motivate the physician to perform euthanasia.
In some cases, this can be accomplished by withdrawing treatment. However, when this is not likely to result in the death of a patient, alleviation of suffering can be the sole reason and only justification to end a person's life. As we have argued, this is a very rare occurrence in the clinical practice of intensive care. Severe hypoglycemia in critically ill: Risk and outcomes
To the Editor:
We want to congratulate Drs. Krinsley and Grover (1) for their efforts to define risk factors for hypoglycemia in the intensive care unit and to determine its effects on outcome, as published recently in Critical Care Medicine. As they note, we published in this journal on the same topic (2, 3). When accounting for time spent in the intensive care unit, Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation (APACHE) score at admission, age, and sex, we found no association between hypoglycemia and mortality, in contrast to Drs. Krinsley and Grover.
In their article, Drs. Krinsley and Grover express their concern about methodologic aspects of our study. Like them, we used a nested case-control design. This is an efficient design combining the advantages of follow-up studies (well-defined cohort, absolute risk estimation) with those of a case-control study (high efficiency and power), with additional close matching on time that allows calculation of incidence rate ratios. This close matching on time also was considered necessary because the time that patients spent in intensive care is highly variable and obviously related to prognosis and risk of hypoglycemia. We performed additional adjustment for severity of illness by correcting for APACHE score in a multiple regression model, because severity of illness is likely to influence both the risk factor of interest (hypoglycemia) and the outcome (mortality). To prevent collinearity in the model, we did not perform additional correction for measures of disease severity. Drs. Krinsley and Grover also matched on diagnostic category (medical septic patients, nonseptic medical patients, surgical or trauma patients) and diabetic status. Furthermore, they corrected for additional factors in multivariate analysis. They selected possibly confounding variables on the basis of statistical significance in univariate regression analysis. This approach may lead to residual confounding as well as overadjustment, because variables that affect the point estimate (confounders) may have been incorrectly left out of the model, and variables that are associated with the exposure and outcome by chance in the data set, but not in the source population, may have been included in the model. A major basic misconception is the adjustment for variables that are related to the outcome but not to the exposure, for to be a confounder, a variable needs to be associated with both. The independent effect of a factor on the outcome parameter as computed by univariate regression analysis is therefore irrelevant. It is more appropriate to select possible confounders based on clinical reasoning and observe whether including these factors in the model indeed changes the relationship between hypoglycemia and outcome (e.g., if adding the confounder to the regression model changes the regression coefficient Ͼ10%). This is how we performed additional adjustment for insulin use in our cohort (3). Drs. Krinsley and Grover state that their adjustment for disease severity may have caused the different results. This is unlikely, as patients with hypoglycemia are generally sicker than those without, which means that adjustment for diabetes and diagnostic category in our cohort would, if anything, attenuate the relationship between hypoglycemia and mortality.
Apart from these methodologic considerations, are there explanations for the opposite results? One may be that Drs. Krinsley and Grover also included hypoglycemic events that occurred before the introduction of strict glycemic control in their analysis (about 40% of all hypoglycemic events). Hypoglycemia may be a sign of metabolic dysregulation, preceding death. It is therefore likely that hypoglycemia in patients who are not treated with glycemic control is associated with mortality, while this is not the case for iatrogenic hypoglycemia caused by strict glycemic control. Inclusion of these two different types of events therefore introduced major confounding by severity of disease, which may not have been adjusted for completely by the matching and multivariate regression analysis, because measures for disease severity were not collected at the time of hypoglycemia, but at the time of admission (APACHE score, diagnostic category). Obviously, this also limits the analysis of risk factors for hypoglycemia.
The main weakness of both our studies is the number of hypoglycemic events (156 in our study, 102 in that by Drs. Krinsley and Grover). Therefore, we invite Drs. Krinsley and Grover, and others, to share their data on hypoglycemia and mortality, to increase the power of the analysis, so we can make a valid statement on this clinically important issue. Tight glucose control and hypoglycemia
We read with interest the article by Drs. Krinsley and Grover (1) , and the accompanying editorial by Nasraway (2), both published in the October issue of Critical Care Medicine. However, we feel concerned by the conclusions drawn by the authors; i.e., that tight glucose control by intensive insulin treatment may improve outcome, while the data shown a) highlight an increased rate of hypoglycemia; and b) clearly identify hypoglycemia as an independent risk factor of mortality by the casecontrol approach and by multivariate logistic regression analysis. Based on data from a before-and-after observational study, Drs. Krinsley and Grover conclude that tight glucose control targeted to achieve intermediate normal or near-normal levels of blood glucose may improve mortality and morbidity in critically ill patients. However, they provided only rather limited data regarding patient characteristics and clinical conditions. Importantly, other modifications in the therapeutic management might have influenced outcome. In our view, these findings warrant further research a) to prevent hypoglycemia during tight glucose control, namely by a careful training of the nursing teams; b) to define the target range of blood glucose associated with the best risk-to-benefit ratio; and c) to characterize more accurately patients in whom tight glucose control is associated with improved outcome. Another option may be to abandon tight glucose control until these pending issues are resolved, as recently suggested (3) .
Finally, reading the editorial of Dr. Nasraway (2) , stating that the results of two prospective randomized controlled and multicentric trials (the German Efficacy of Volume Substitution and Insulin Therapy in Severe Sepsis [VISEP] and the European Glucontrol studies) (4, 5) "were fatally undermined by protocol violations, experimental design flaws, and insufficient sample size" (2), we are deeply concerned that the principles of evidencebased medicine are not only fully acknowledged but rather neglected.
Both are carefully prepared clinical trials, fulfilling the "gold standard" of research in clinical medicine and will be published soon. Because only preliminary results of these trials have been presented in international meetings, such comments before the publication of the final data are not in accordance with good scientific practice and should be omitted. Indeed, the data submitted for publication obviously will undergo a careful peer-review process, implying a fair interpretation and a formal acknowledgment of the limitations. The importance and relevance of such multicenter large trials is much larger than studies performed in one center and than hypothesis-generating retrospective studies, which are of minor value in clinical decision-making.
